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Abstract
This paper analyzes tari competition by investigating the strategic interactions among
firms that are highly mobile across national boundaries. Although high transport costs
yield a geographic dispersion of the industry, suciently low transport costs result in a
core-periphery location where nobody bears tari burdens. In any case, the world econ-
omy would be in a much better position under an international coordination scheme. An
economy is only required to enforce a weak international trade agreement for improving
global welfare.
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1 Introduction
The significance of strategic relationships among governments has long been documented in
the literature on foreign direct investments (FDIs). This is because international mobility of
capital creates fiscal externalities; a country’s taxation, public expenditures and trade policies
may cause a flow of capital to another country, which influence the economic welfare of the
residents in that country. In response to these international externalities, a coordinated in-
ternational fiscal policy must be identified and evaluated with extreme prudence in order to
improve welfare. In this context, the example of governments independently competing for a
fixed amount of mobile capital stock through a tari policy may be considered. According to
the “tari-jumping” motivation1, governments may have an incentive to over-protect domestic
firms in order to attract capital, despite a tari barrier that essentially restricts trade and distorts
the allocation of resources. Increased capital mobility engages governments in global trade
negotiations.
This paper focuses on the relationship between an optimal trade policy and trade costs.
“New economic geography” literature continually explains the matter in which changing trade
costs may endogenously lead to industrial agglomeration and geographical dierentiation.
Trade policy influences the total trade costs, which are divided into transport costs and taris in
this paper. Although the former are exogenously given, the latter are strategically determined
by governments; therefore, transport costs are of consequence in both industrial locations as
well as for formulating trade strategies. This implies that the level of transport costs signifi-
cantly impact the welfare implications of the non-cooperative trade policies.
This paper investigates an optimal tari policy in a strategic setting that considers the loca-
tion choices of imperfectly competitive firms. We consider the tari competitions among the
governments and establish a relationship between the strategic interactions in the trade policy
and the degree of market integration (as measured by exogenous transport costs). Tari rates
on import goods are established for maximizing a representative consumer’s indirect utility.
Tari competition involves international externalities associated with capital mobility.
Thus far, only a few attempts have been made to address the issues regarding tari compe-
tition in a new economic geography framework. A few important exceptions are Haufler and
Wooton (1999), Ludema (2002), and Mai, Peng, and Tabuchi (2008; hereafter MPT). Haufler
1For example, Bhagwati (1987), Motta (1992), Belderbos and Sleuwaegen (1998), Dehejia and Weichenrieder
(2001), and Blonigen, Tomlin and Wilson (2004).
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and Wooton (1999) considered a framework wherein two countries of dierent sizes compete
for a foreign-owned monopolist location. They highlighted that a tari policy reinforces the
importance of selecting a large region for establishing a plant. Unfortunately, their study lacks
a detailed welfare analysis. Since monopoly firms are owned by foreigners, their contributions
do not provide any insight into the distortions in the capital market. Therefore, the assump-
tion of a single firm is disregarded and both spatial dispersion and industrial agglomeration are
comprehensively studied.
Ludema (2002) focused on the relationship between transport costs and trade agreements
under increasing returns and imperfect competition in a repeated game framework. In a one-
shot game, each government’s dominant strategy is modeled to impose a tari that is high
enough to attract multinational enterprises. However, one-shot tari competition does not nec-
essarily result in such tari war, even taking into account the influence of taris on the location
decisions of firms. In the MPT model as well as ours, each country avoids a tari war. The
models exhibit asymmetry in the equilibrium tari strategies and location configurations. More
importantly, when asymmetric Nash equilibrium arises, it is dicult to enforce cooperative
agreements in the absence of supranational political institutions despite the governments being
suciently patient.
This paper extends and complements the MPT argument regarding the strategic tari policy,
wherein CES preferences and monopolistic competition have been introduced. We introduce
strategic interactions among firms that are Cournot competitors and encounter segmented mar-
kets. In our model, the relationship between an optimal tari policy and transport costs are
analogous to MPT’s model, wherein firms can freely enter and exit a monopolistic competitive
market. High transport costs induce governments to set low trade barriers and lead to disper-
sion of production. Conversely, tari competition with suciently low transport costs leads
to a core-periphery structure wherein the core government imposes a suciently high tari
and the periphery government eliminates its trade barrier. As a result, nobody bears the tari
burden (i.e., de facto free trade becomes the equilibrium).
Our primary objective is to compare the welfare implications. Even if the equilibrium ac-
tions based on a theoretical model appear to be compatible with the evidence, we must never-
theless exercise caution while making political decisions. The economic welfare implications
presented in this paper are rather dierent from those oered by MPT. Although tari com-
petition over large distances may reduce welfare, an internationally binding agreement is not
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necessary for free trade. In addition, de facto free trade between the core and the periphery
governments will not be globally ecient. In this paper, we propose a practical international
rule for improving world welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 characterizes the tari competition for duopoly firms. Section 4 indicates the re-
sults for a more generalized case (i.e., oligopoly economy). Finally, Section 5 presents the
concluding remarks.
2 The Model
2.1 Production
Our model is a reciprocal dumping model a` la Brander (1981) that considers footloose capital.
In this model, the economy is assumed to comprise two countries, that is, i 2 f1; 2g, two factors
of production (capital and labor) and two sectors: manufacturing (M) and agriculture (A).
Further, capital is freely mobile between these two countries. The total endowments of
capital, K, are evenly owned by identical consumers who inelastically supply one unit of labor
each.
The two countries have identical preferences, technologies, and populations. L denotes
the labor population in each country. Although labor is internationally immobile, it possesses
intersectoral mobility.
In the agricultural sector, a homogeneous good (A-good) is produced by employing only
labor according to the constant returns technology. A-good is traded with zero transaction costs
under perfect competition and is taken as a nume´raire (the marginal cost is normalized to one).
The manufacturing sector employs both the factors of production in order to produce a ho-
mogeneous good (M-good) under imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. Each
firm requires one unit of capital for operations and aM units of labor per unit of output. Now, ni
denotes the number of firms located in country i; therefore, the total number of firms is given
by n = n1 + n2 = K. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that K = 2.2 In other words, firms
behave like Cournot duopolists.
2This assumption will be relaxed in Section 4, wherein the qualitative nature of the analysis remains un-
changed.
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Shipping a unit of M-good from country i to country j requires positive specific taris34
 j  0 and positive transport costs  > 0. Therefore, the total access costs that need to be paid
by firms for exporting goods to country j are + j units of the nume´raire. Governments impose
specific import taris to maximize their objective functions and redistribute its tari revenue to
the consumers. The equilibrium condition in the tari policy of government i is given by
Lsi = in jq ji; (1)
where si denotes the per unit lump-sum transfer and q ji denotes the quantity of imports from
country j.
Now it is assumed that the markets are spatially segmented. Therefore, the profit of an
identical firm located in region i is given by
i = (pi   wiaM)qii + (p j   wiaM       j)qi j   ri; (2)
where ri and wi represent the rewards to capital and labor, respectively, pi denotes the price of
M-good, and qii denotes country i’s consumption of theM-good produced in country i.
Because of the costless trade of the nume´raire, the equilibrium wages of the workers in both
the countries are regarded as unity; that is, w1 = w2 = 1.
2.2 Preferences
We assume a quasi-linear utility with a quadratic subutility of a representative consumer in
country i, which is expressed as follows:
Ui = xi + Di   2 D
2
i ; (3)
where xi and Di represent the consumption of A-good and M-good respectively.  and  are
constant parameters.
The budget constraint is given by
xi + piDi = Yi + si + !; (4)
3For the sake of simplicity, indeterminate locations have not been considered in this paper; therefore, negative
taris have been omitted. In addition, MPT assumed positive taris and emphasized that, in reality, negative taris
are rare. Even if negative taris are considered, the equilibrium location configuration remains unchanged in the
case of a duopoly.
4It is assumed that the features of the model are independent of how transport costs are modeled — that is,
whether they are per unit or ad valorem costs. See Behrens (2006).
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where Yi denotes the income of an individual and ! denotes the initial endowment, which is
assumed to be large enough to ensure a positive demand of the nume´raire.
The utility function (3) yields the following inverse demand function forM-good:
pi =     (niqii + n jq ji)L : (5)
The utility maximization problem yields the following standard indirect utility function:
Vi =
(   pi)2
2
+ Yi + si + !: (6)
The first term represents country i’s consumer surplus in theM-good market.
2.3 Structure of the Tari Game
The tari game comprises the following three stages, each of which is analyzed. In the first
stage, both the national governments simultaneously and irreversibly5 select their specific tari
rates, where country i’s strategy is i 2 R+. In the second stage, firms select the location
for establishing their plant after observing both the taris. In the third stage, firms initiate
production in the international market.
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Trade Patterns
Here, the duopolistic market of sectorM is discussed in detail.
Firms cannot always yield positive revenues from exports. As indicated below, the price
of M-good is endogenously determined as a function of taris. The threshold values of taris
at which a firm located in country j is not active in country i are defined as i = i( j). If
5The reason why governments can credibly make their short-run policy choices even before firms make their
“long-run” choices (the mobility of capital is assumed to be costless here) may appear to be slightly confusing.
In Haufler and Wooton (1999), taris are selected only after the location decision has been made. However, the
order of play adopted here follows MPT to enable a comparison of results.
5
i  i( j), then q ji = 0. The sets that represent trade patterns are defined as follows:
B =f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j 1 < 1(2) and 2 < 2(1)g;
U i j =f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j i  i( j) and  j <  j(i)g for i , j;
A =f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j 1  1(2) and 2  2(1)g:
The trade pattern sets B, U i j and A represent pairs of taris that characterize bilateral trade,
unilateral trade (only firms in country i can export to country j), and autarky, respectively.
3.2 Third-Stage Game: Cournot Competition
Given the tari rates and the location of the industries, each firm maximizes its operating profit
in the last stage.
The equilibrium price ofM-good may be expressed as follows:
pi =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
 + niaM
ni + 1
if i  i( j);
 + 2aM + n j( + i)
3 if i < i( j):
(7)
Therefore, the no trade threshold is derived as follows:
i =
a
ni + 1
  ; (8)
where a     aM is assumed to be constant and positive.6 As we will observe below, ni is
determined as a function of the taris. Equation (7) implies that when all other things remain
constant, an increase in the number of firms located in the country result in lowering the prices
of the goods there.
The equilibrium reward to fixed costs is derived as follows:
 If (1; 2) 2 A,
ri =
 
a
ni + 1
!2 L

: (9)
 If (1; 2) 2 U i j,
ri =
 
a
ni + 1
!2 L

+
"
a   (n j + 1)( +  j)
3
#2 L

; (10)
r j =
"
a + ni( +  j)
3
#2 L

: (11)
6This assumption ensures that the individual demand forM-good is positive for any positive access costs.
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 If (1; 2) 2 B,
ri =
"
a + n j( + i)
3
#2 L

+
"
a   (n j + 1)( +  j)
3
#2 L

: (12)
3.3 Second-Stage Game: Equilibrium Distribution of Firms
In the second stage, firms can freely move to any location where they can earn a higher profit.
The strategic interactions regarding the location preferences of duopolists have been consid-
ered. In other words, each firm cannot disregard the decision made by the other.
Lemma 1. The location game possesses at least one Nash equilibrium for any given pair of
positive taris.
Proof. We consider an issue wherein two firms determine the locations for establishing their
businesses. Table 1 indicates the payo matrix of this location game.
[Table 1. HERE]
The term ri(n1) denotes the rent of return when a firm operates in country i, and is dependent
on the number of firms located in country 1. Here, it may be recalled that each firm possesses
the same technology. Subsequently, we are only required to evaluate the signs of the following:
r1(2)   r2(1) and r1(1)   r2(0). The signs of r1(2)   r2(1) and r1(1)   r2(0) indicate the ideal
locations for a company to establish its factory if the rival establishes its factory in country 1
and country 2, respectively. Since r1(n1) and r2(n1) take the real values for any (1; 2) 2 R2+ at
all trade patterns, it is always possible to ascertain these signs. Therefore, Lemma 1 holds. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the location game.7 Both r1(2) = r2(1) and r1(1) = r2(0)
are simultaneously satisfied only if 1 = 2 =   < 0. This implies that (1; 2) 2 R2+ s.t.
r1(2) > r2(1) and r1(1) < r2(0) are empty sets. Therefore, both n1 = 2 and n1 = 0 are not
simultaneously supported in equilibrium.
[Table 2. HERE]
7When r1(2) = r2(1) and r1(1) > r2(0), then both n1 = 2 and n1 = 1 are Nash equilibrium locations in this
game. For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed that n1 = 1 if r1(2) = r2(1) and r1(1) > r2(0). Likewise, when
r1(2) < r2(1) and r1(1) = r2(0), the symmetric location is assumed to be n1 = 1, even though n1 = 0 is also a Nash
equilibrium location.
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The sets representing location configurations are defined as follows.
C1 = f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j n1 = 2g;
I = f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j n1 = 1g;
C2 = f(1; 2) 2 R2+ j n1 = 0g:
3.4 First-Stage Game: Tari Competition for Welfare
Before analyzing welfare, we must consider the per capita income, Yi. Yi consists of wages and
capital income. Wages are normalized to 1. The global reward to capital is given by n1r1+n2r2,
which is equally distributed among all the consumers. Therefore, the per capita income is given
by
Yi = 1 +
(n1r1 + n2r2)
2L
: (13)
The first-stage game considers tari competition. The welfare maximization problem may
be divided into the following two component parts. First, the “local” maxima within each of
the subsets may be identified from the first-order conditions (see Appendix 1). However, these
are not necessarily global solutions. Second, the welfare levels are compared and investigated
for identifying whether or not either of the governments has any incentive to deviate.
National welfare can be altered by a tari increase through the following three channels.
First, in contrast to the monopolistic competition model, strategic interactions among firms play
an important role in welfare analysis. Protecting the domestic firm in one country increases do-
mestic sales and lowers foreign sales in the market because domestic and foreign outputs are
strategic substitutes under Cournot competition. Such a production shift benefits the domestic
firm, and consequently enhances domestic welfare by saving on transport costs. At the same
time, domestic protection reduces the total supply in the domestic market, thereby increasing
the domestic price.8 As Brander and Krugman (1983) emphasized, each government encoun-
ters a trade-o between saving uneconomical transport costs as a result of trade and fostering
competition. The level of transport costs and the location configuration of the firms determine
which one of the two eects, the production-shifting eect or the anti-competitive eect, is
more dominant.
8Now firms can only partially transfer the marginal costs to foreign consumers (@pi=@i 2 [0; 2=3] if i < i).
In other words, there exists “reciprocal dumping” which can be regarded as terms-of-trade gains (or losses). We
would like to emphasize that dumping will work even if firms co-locate.
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Second, a tari change generates a rent-shifting eect that creates international externali-
ties. Since the equities of firms are equally owned by domestic and foreign consumers, domes-
tic consumers receive only half of the profits (or losses) from a change in rents. For example, if
a reduction in the operating profits earned by firms in the domestic market is exactly oset by
an increase in the domestic consumers’ surplus and tari revenues, then the domestic welfare
must increase. Furthermore, both the production-shifting gains and the anti-competitive losses
influence foreign welfare.
The first-order conditions within each subset are indicated in Appendix 1 and represent the
reactions of each of the countries to their rival’s tari without any changes in the trade patterns
and the locations of the firms. Keeping trade flow and capital allocation unchanged, the optimal
trade policy is to reduce the tari to zero.9
Third, trade barriers operate through a tari-jumping relocation of firms. Raising tari bar-
riers above a certain level would attract additional capital into the region because suppliers want
to be protected by a high tari rate and export goods at a low tari rate. Spatial concentration
enhances the competitive pressure on the firms, and therefore a lower price ofM-good benefits
consumers who incur no trade costs. Despite this, an increase in the number of firms located
in a country will certainly lead to a reduction in this country’s tari revenue. We must not
disregard the fact that location configuration influences the impacts of both production-shifting
and anti-competitive eects.
3.4.1 Benchmark Case: International Tari Coordination
We assume that there is a world-level benevolent planner who simultaneously establishes the
tari levels in both countries, thereby maximizing the sum of indirect utilities, which is given
by
max
1;2
L(V1 + V2):
Subsequently, the following proposition describes the optimal tari policy as a function of the
transport costs, .
Proposition 1. It is assumed that the economy is duopolistic. On the basis of this assumption,
tari coordination is obtained as follows:
(i) For   a=4, (1; 2) 2 A \ I;
9This is largely owing to the assumption of symmetry in country size.
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(ii) For a=5 <  < a=4, (1; 2) 2 B \ I and 1 = 2 = 5   a > 0;
(iii) For   a=5, (1; 2) = (0; 0) 2 B \ I.
Proof. See Appendix 2. 
When wasteful transport charges are suciently higher than demand, international trade
becomes rather expensive. Therefore, it is more eective to impose high taris that restrict the
import of products and promote domestic production. However, firms need to gradually adopt
an open trade policy when the transport costs become so low that the wastage of resources is
lesser than the loss from the anti-competitive eect.
For any levels of transport costs, the benchmark policy requires dispersed locations. The
following is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 1.10
Corollary 1. If countries are symmetric with respect to their populations, agglomeration of the
manufacturing sector is inecient.
How are agglomeration diseconomies obtained? The strategic interactions among oligopolis-
tic competitors play an important role in this analysis. When two firms are located in the same
country, there is no cost dierence in the segmented markets. However, when the firms are
located in dierent countries, each firm enjoys an advantage of circumventing the payment of
trade costs in its own home market. Consequently, domestic production substitutes for import
in both the country, thereby saving on transport costs.
3.4.2 Non-cooperative Equilibiria
We now investigate the case where governments select a tari rate within their jurisdictions for
maximizing the welfare of its citizens.
For   a=4, the sets C1 and C2 are empty. All strategies induce a dispersed location.
This yields a unique free-trade11 equilibrium in this game; that is, 1 = 2 = 0. Furthermore,
reducing the tari rate is a dominant strategy. However, owing to the high transport costs in
the case of free trade, the closed economy yields more desirable trade patterns for both the
countries. The tari protection reduces transport costs.
10In the case of K  2, we can also derive Corollary 1 (see Section 4).
11This depends on the assumption of both symmetric countries and duopolistic markets. However, if we relax
even one of these assumptions, then the analytical description cannot be pursued over a broad range of parameter
values.
10
Proposition 2. When transport costs are higher than demand, free trade is a unique subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the tari competition for duopoly firms in identical countries. This
equilibrium, wherein firms are geographically dispersed, is less ecient than that obtained
under tari coordination.
Proof. See Appendix 3. 
The reason for the dierence in the result is that the benevolent planner internalizes the
rent-shifting eect, which is counterbalanced by summing the welfare of the countries.
Subsequently, the case where  < a=4 is considered. Figure 1 illustrates equilibrium trade
as well as location patterns as the functions of the countries’ tari oers.
[Figure 1. HERE]
When transport costs are lower than demand, the game exhibits dierent results. There
exists no equilibrium on set I in this range.
Lemma 2. If transport costs are low enough to cause agglomeration, then a geographically
dispersed location is not achievable in equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix 4. 
Propositions 1 and 2 and Lemma 2 indicate that non-cooperative tari competition is un-
ambiguously harmful for global welfare. Although the economy requires international policy
coordination, according to Lemma 2, mutual agreements among governments, which both fa-
cilitate and regulate trade, are dicult to accomplish as the economy integrates.
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium of the game for  < a=4.
Proposition 3. An equilibrium in pure strategies does not exist for intermediate transport costs.
When transport costs are suciently lower than demand, there exists a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium such that one country sets its tari at zero and the other imposes a suciently
high tari with industrial agglomeration. This tari competition deteriorates global welfare
whenever the transport costs are strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix 5. 
Even among symmetric countries, we arrived at the asymmetric distribution of capital in
equilibrium. Tari competition with low transport costs leads to a core-periphery economy
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wherein the periphery country imposes a zero tari for importing goods. When transport costs
are suciently low12, it is rather economical for the periphery country to import goods. The
government has a weak incentive to attract firms by increasing the level of tari protection,
which exacerbates the anti-competitive eect and reduces capital income. This is in sharp
contrast to Ludema (2002), wherein all the countries provide their domestic plants with the
shield of tari protection regardless of the behavior of other governments in the static Nash
equilibrium.
In this case, no country collects tari revenue in equilibrium for low transport costs. This
indicates the existence of a de facto free trade. This result may support Waugh (2007), who
argued that, as compared to rich countries, poor countries must bear higher costs in order to
export goods.
However, in our model, the governments cannot select a pure strategy for intermediate
transport costs. When the transport costs are not too low, the core-periphery structure is not an
equilibrium structure because the periphery country raises its tari rate in order to recapture
the firm.
3.5 Discussion
In terms of the relationship between equilibrium location configurations and the level of trans-
port costs, our quasi-linear utility model with variable demand elasticity is partially consistent
with MPT, which assumed a constant markup pricing rule for firms. Both MPT’s and our results
indicate that although high transport costs yield a symmetric dispersed location, suciently low
transport costs lead to a core-periphery structure virtually without any tari burden.
However, the implications for welfare are contrary to those for transport costs. MPT sug-
gested that suciently high transport costs result in an equilibrium wherein both governments
establish excessive protection, which necessitates a mutually binding agreement for free trade.
However, our model implies that the non-cooperative equilibrium is inecient for very low tar-
is but not for very high taris, because of a lack of “taste for variety.” In addition, de facto free
trade with suciently low transport costs is optimal in MPT; this is contrary to Proposition 3.
Even without market-distorting taris, we find that distortions in the location of firms continue
12The core-periphery equilibrium exists for  < (9   p78)a=12  0:014a. This does not appear to be a broad
range. In MPT, the threshold iceberg transport costs that an agglomerated configuration can achieve in equilibrium
is given by 1  t < 1:28.
12
to exist because of the Nash policies. The political implication derived from the monopolistic
competition setting may therefore be a model-specific result.
This dierence in results is largely due to the dierences in the assumed preferences. Since
this paper excludes the taste for variety, it was required to consider significant savings in trans-
port costs and increased domestic production of homogeneous goods.
Here, we discuss the manner in which our model may be extended to a setting of self-
enforcing agreements. In Section 3.4.1, we analyze the cooperative outcome that maximizes
the joint surplus of the two countries, and subsequently pose the following question: If interna-
tional transfer payments are not available, how should agreements be designed so as to enable
their eective implementation? For   a=4, the outcome of international cooperation Pareto
dominates the Nash equilibrium. Therefore, cooperative self-enforcing agreements are well
characterized by certain repeated games.13 In other words, when the rate at which governments
discount the future is below a critical level, the tari coordination policy can be eectively im-
plemented without international transfers. However, for  < a=4, the outcome of international
cooperation does not Pareto dominate the Nash equilibrium. In the absence of side payments,
international tari coordination leads to industrial delocation and welfare loss for households in
the core country. Both countries always have an incentive to deviate from the trade agreement
and impose a tari that is high enough to attract FDI. Therefore, it is dicult to provide a use-
ful and practical method to establish a self-enforcing agreement by considering circumstances
such as the repeated game for suciently low transport costs.
We note that a simple agreement that specifies tari ceilings will enable the establishment
of more ecient tari levels. Our study, for example, requires only two conditions, which may
be expressed as follows: a lower limit on taris, i.e., i  5   a, for   a=5, and an upper
limit, i.e., i < 2 

1   p1   4=a

a=2   , for   5a=24. Under these constraints, non-
cooperative tari competition can eectively implement the tari coordination results for any
level of transport costs. When governments need to save high transport costs, the lower limit
on the tari is the relevant constraint. In contrast, when transport costs are low, it is desirable
to restrict the use of taris as an industry-grabbing policy. The upper limit on taris prompts
governments to lower their taris to a level below the limit in order to reduce the distortion in
prices.
This argument emphasizes the importance of a commitment by each government to prevent
13See, for example, Friedman (1971), Bagwell and Staiger (1990) and Ludema (2002).
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the deprivation of firms by imposing a prohibitive tari. In fact, the World Trade Organization
(WTO) determines a bound rate, which is the maximum tari that the members can charge.
The tari ceilings may be of consequence in practice albeit they are much higher than their
corresponding applied rates.
4 Extension: Oligopoly
This section discusses an extension of our model, that is, an oligopolistic economy, where
K = n  2. Consider the following two types of locational equilibria: interior equilibria where
r1 = r2 and n1=n 2 (0; 1), and corner solutions where ni = n and ri > r j.14
In this case, the marginal eect of the tari on the firms’ location choices can be compre-
hensively studied. However, the analytical solution becomes uninformative because the form
of the indirect utility function is highly non-linear and includes a flat range. Instead, we rely
on numerical simulation.
In order to enable a comparison with MPT, it is assumed that  < a. This yields a relation-
ship between optimal taris and transport costs that is similar to the relationship demonstrated
in MPT. In other words, a suciently high transport cost gives 1 = 2 > 0 and n1 = n2 = K=2
at the equilibrium. In addition, a suciently low transport cost provides a core-periphery lo-
cation; that is, i >  j = 0 and ni = n. The symmetric equilibrium may be derived so long as
the following inequality holds:   a[ 1 + p1 + (n   1)=(n + 1)]=(n   1) (see Appendix 6 for
details).
Once again, the welfare implication in our study is dierent from that in MPT. When trans-
port costs are high, the equilibrium welfare in the oligopoly case can be further improved
by increasing the tari rates imposed by both the governments as indicated in the case of a
duopoly. Besides, when transport costs are suciently low, the free trade equilibrium rather
than the core-periphery equilibrium derived by the non-cooperative game is more beneficial for
global welfare; this result contradicts MPT’s finding. Our main results are remotely related to
the specifications of a duopoly.
14This condition determines a finite number of firms, n1 and n2 (and n1=n), which may not necessarily be an
integer. However, in this section, we will assume that the proportion of the firms located in country 1, n1=n, is
continuously dierentiable on (0; 1) with respect to taris.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a strategic tari competition model with factor mobility.
Proposition 2 suggests that the tari competition between symmetric countries generate sym-
metric access costs and an inecient equilibrium when transport costs are higher than demand.
Consequently, mutual trade protection may improve welfare levels. On the other hand, tari
competition results in asymmetric access costs and spatial agglomeration of firms in the pro-
cess of economic integration. In such a case, nobody bears tari burdens; however, industrial
distributions without free entry are inecient in such equilibria. Although these findings are
contrary to the findings of previous studies, both the models have indicated similar relation-
ships between tari policy and trade freeness. Therefore, as is evident, this model must be
interpreted prudently.
We found that establishing constraints for tari rates and not negotiating these rigid tari
constraints may enhance global welfare. An international trade agreement that establishes a
lower limit on taris for high transport costs and an upper limit on taris for small transport
costs improves welfare. An agreement that prevents governments from engaging in a tari war
for attracting capital results in an accommodative trade policy. Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010)
argued that the presence of both uncertainty and contracting costs may explain a weakness of
the trade agreement made under the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT)/WTO.
Another explanation for the gap between the bound duty rate and the applied tari rate as it
exists in reality was also oered in this study. The strategy space available to players will be
an important component in a game.
Appendix
Appendix 1: First-order Conditions of Each Set
The following indicates the first-order conditions and all these conditions also satisfy the asso-
ciated second-order conditions:
 If (1; 2) 2 B \ I, 1 = 2 = 0.
 If (1; 2) 2 U i j \ I,  j = 0.
 If (1; 2) 2 Ci,  j = 0.
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When country i does not importM-good, i is indeterminate.
Appendix 2
Global welfare per capita may be calculated as follows:
(V1 + V2)
(1;2)2B\I = 118 [16a2 + 222   21   22 + 10(1 + 2)   2a(8 + 1 + 2)]
+ 2(1 + !)
(V1 + V2)
(1;2)2U i j\I = 172 [59a2 + 442 + 40 j   42j   8a(4 +  j)] + 2(1 + !)
(V1 + V2)
(1;2)2Ci = 29 [4a2 + 22 +  j   2j   a(4 +  j)] + 2(1 + !)
Subsequently, the following are the first-order conditions:
 If (1; 2) 2 B \ I, 1 = 2 = 5   a. According to the non-negativity requirement on i,
1 = 2 = 0 are global welfare maximizers for   a=5.
 If (1; 2) 2 U i j\I,  j = 5 a. For 5a=24 <  < a=4 and i  a=2 , (i; 5 a) 2 U i j\I.
 If (1; 2) 2 Ci,  j = (   a)=2 < 0.
All the conditions also satisfy the second-order condition.
Substituting the optimal taris from above into global welfare yields the maximum welfare
levels within each of the subsets. We obtain Proposition 1 by comparing these maximum
welfare levels. Figure 2 summarizes these calculations.
[Figure 2. HERE]
Appendix 3
For  2 [a=4; a=2), we have
V1
(0;0)2B\I   V1(1;0)2U12\I = (a   2)212 > 0
and
V1
(0;2)2U21\I   V1(1;2)2A = (a   2)212 > 0:
A protected country always profits by opening up its import market. This discussion is com-
pletely pertinent for country 2 as well. Therefore, (1; 2) = (0; 0) 2 B \ I is a unique Nash
equilibrium. Proposition 1 indicates that free trade is inecient. This proves Proposition 2.
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Appendix 4
We demonstrate that there exists no Nash equilibrium for  < a=4 such that (i) (1; 2) 2 B \ I,
(1; 2) 2 A, and (1; 2) 2 U i j \ I. The following proof relates to country 1 but is completely
pertinent to country 2.
For  < a=4 and given  j = 0, country i decides to deprive firms with i  i.
V1
(0;0)2B\I   V1(1;0)2U12\C1 =   18 (4a   9) < 0:
Therefore, free trade is no longer a global Nash equilibrium.
Likewise, for  < a=4 and given that  j  a=2   , country i continues to reduce its tari
until its consumers can importM-good.
V1
(a=4 ;2)2U21\I   V1(1;2)2A = a(3a   8)48 > 0
In other words, autarky is also unachievable in equilibrium.
In addition, we can demonstrate that in the set U ji \ I, exporting country j has an incentive
to open up its market.
V1
(1;a=4 )2U12\I   V1(a=4 ;a=4 )2B\I = a( 3a + 8)48
Therefore, for  < a=4, the protected country will reduce its tari in the absence of the core.
There is no Nash equilibrium in U i j \ I for  < a=4.
Appendix 5
Lemma 2 indicates that all Nash equilibria in pure strategies must belong to either C1 or C2 for
 < a=4 if they exist. We indicate that a periphery country has an incentive to increase its tari
and refuse to import rather than agree to be a periphery for at least  2 (3a=16; a=4). Since
the two countries are assumed to be of the same size, this model is symmetric. Therefore, we
examine whether or not country 1 will be a core in equilibrium.
First, we consider 1  1(2) for any 2.
V2
(1;0)2U12\C1   V2(1;a=4 )2U12\I = a2   72a + 482144
This equation takes a negative value if  > (9   p78)a=12  0:014a. Therefore, in the range
 2 (3a=16; a=4), a periphery country will deprive the protected core country of capital.
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Second, we identify a range wherein a periphery country can become a core by increasing
its tari. When 1 = 2 and 2 = 0, then r1(2) = r2(1) where 2 =

1   p1   4=a

a=2 . 2
is a horizontal intercept of r1(2) = r2(1) line. Here, (a=4 ) 2 > 0 since  < 3a=16. In other
words, when  > 3a=16, periphery country 2 never obtains the entire capital by increasing its
tari for a given 1 2 [2; a=2   ) such that (1; 0) 2 C1.
@

V2
(1;0)2C1   V2(1;2)2U21\I =@1 = a   5   519 < 0
The dierence decreases in 1 for  > 3a=16 and 1  2. Therefore, if V2

C1   V2

U21\I < 0 in
the border between U21 \ I and A, which is the point at which the dierence is smallest, then
V2

C1 < V2

U21\I holds for all 1  2. The following equation is presented for  > 3a=16:
lim
!0

V2
(2+;0)2C1   V2(2+;2)2U21\I
=   136

14a   122   3a2 p1   4=a < 0
Overall, periphery always endeavors to recover its capital share and unilaterally protect a
domestic firm.
For the second result, we found Nash equilibria that belonged to the sets C1 or C2 for  <
(9  p78)a=12. In this range, we understand that V2
(1;0)2U12\C1 > V2(1;a=4 )2U12\I > V2(1;2)2A
and V1
(0;0)2B\I < V1(1;0)2U12\C1 . Therefore, 1 > a=2    and 2 = 0 are subgame perfect Nash
equilibria. Subsequently, C1 is obtained.
Although another equilibrium could exist, all equilibria resulted in the core-periphery loca-
tion with “limit tax” owing to Lemma 2.
Corollary 1 indicates that the equilibria are trivially inecient.
Appendix 6: Simulations
Solving the systems of the first-order conditions in B \ I (i.e., n1=n 2 (0; 1) and i < i for
i 2 f1; 2g) yields the following solution:
1 = 2 = 
B\I > 0
Symmetric property implies that when 1 = 2 = B\I, n1 = n2.
Here we examine whether or not 1 = 2 = B\I is a global equilibrium or not. In other
words, we investigate whether or not a country has an incentive to change its tari and move
out of B \ I. If V1
(B\I ;B\I )2B\I < V1(0;B\I )2C2 , then 1 = 2 = B\I is not a Nash equilibrium.
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If (0; B\I) < C2, then 1 = 2 = B\I is a unique Nash equilibrium.
If (0; B\I) belongs to the set C2, then V1
(B\I ;B\I )2B\I < V1(0;B\I )2C2 for any feasible
parameter settings with numerical calculations. We can also see that V2
(0;2) > V2(0;002 ) for any
2 and 002 such that (0; 2) 2 C2 and (0; 002 ) 2 B \ I with numerical calculations. Therefore,
Nash equilibria must belong to C j with i = 0.
Since we derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium when C2 = ; in R2+,
  a
n   1
266666664 1 +
s
1 +
n   1
(n + 1)
377777775
is a necessary condition for a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
19
References
[1] Bagwell K, Staiger RW (1990) A theory of managed trade. American Economic Review
80: 779-795
[2] Bagwell K, Staiger RW (1999) An economic theory of GATT. American Economic Re-
view 89: 215-248
[3] Bagwell K, Staiger RW (2005) Enforcement, private political pressure, and the general
agreement on taris and trade: world trade organization escape clause. Journal of Legal
Studies 34: 471-513
[4] Baldwin RE, Forslid R, Martin P, Ottaviano GIP, Robert-Nicoud F (2003) Economic ge-
ography & public policy. Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.
[5] Barros PP, Cabral L (2000) Competing for foreign direct investment. Review of Interna-
tional Economics 8: 360-371
[6] Behrens K (2004) Agglomeration without trade: how non-traded goods shape the space-
economy. Journal of Urban Economics 55: 68-92
[7] Behrens K (2005) How endogenous asymmetries in interregional market access trigger
regional divergence. Regional Science and Urban Economics 35: 471-492
[8] Behrens K (2006) Do changes in transport costs and taris shape the space-economy in
the same way? Papers in Regional Science 85: 379-399
[9] Belderbos R, Sleuwaegen L (1998) Tari jumping DFI and export substitution: Japanese
electronics firms in Europe. International Journal of Industrial Organization 16: 601-638
[10] Benassy JP (1996) Taste for variety and optimum production patterns in monopolistic
competition. Economics Letters 52: 41-47
[11] Bergstrand JH, Egger P, Larch M (2010) Gravity redux: estimation of gravity-equation
coecients, elasticities of substitution, and general equilibrium comparative statics under
asymmetric bilateral trade costs. mimeo.
[12] Bhagwati J (1987) VERs, quid pro quo FDI and VIEs: political-economy-theoretic anal-
ysis. International Economic Journal 1: 1-14
20
[13] Bhattacharjea A (1995) Strategic taris and endogenous market structures: trade and
industrial policies under imperfect competition. Journal of Development Economics 47:
287-312
[14] Blonigen BA, Tomlin K, Wilson WW (2004) Tari-jumping FDI and domestic firms’
profits. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D’Economique 37: 656-677
[15] Boadway R, Cu K, Marceau N (2002) Inter-jurisdictional competition for firms. Inter-
national Economic Review 43: 761-782
[16] Brander JA (1981) Intra-industry trade in identical commodities. Journal of International
Economics 11: 1-14
[17] Brander JA (1995) Strategic trade policy. In: Grossman GM, Rogo K. (eds.) Handbook
of International Economics, vol.3, North Holland, Amsterdam.
[18] Brander JA, Krugman P (1983) A ‘reciprocal dumping’ model of international trade. Jour-
nal of International Economics 15: 313-321
[19] Brander JA, Spencer BJ (1987) Foreign direct investment with unemployment and en-
dogenous taxes and taris. Journal of International Economics 22: 257-279
[20] Collie DR (1994) Endogenous timing in trade policy games: should governments use
countervailing duties? Review of World Economics 130: 191-209
[21] Dehejia VH, Weichenrieder AJ (2001) Tari jumping foreign investment and capital tax-
ation. Journal of International Economics 53: 223-230
[22] Dick AR (1993) Strategic trade-policy and welfare: the empirical consequences of cross-
ownership. Journal of International Economics 35: 227-249
[23] Dixit A (1984) International trade policy for oligopolistic industries. The Economic Jour-
nal 94: 1-16
[24] Eaton J, Grossman GM (1986) Optimal trade and industrial policy under oligopoly. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 101: 383-406
[25] Ferrett B, Wooton I (2010) Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax compe-
tition. Canadian Journal of Economics-Revue Canadienne D’Economique 43: 776-794
21
[26] Friedman JW (1971) A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. Review of Economic
Studies 38: 1-12
[27] Haaland JI, Wooton I (1999) International competition for multinational investment.
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 101: 631-649
[28] Haufler A, Wooton I (1999) Country size and tax competition for foreign direct invest-
ment. Journal of Public Economics 71: 121-139
[29] Haufler A, Wooton I (2010) Competition for firms in an oligopolistic industry: the impact
of economic integration. Journal of International Economics 80: 239-248
[30] Horn H, Maggi G, Staiger RW (2010) Trade agreements as endogenously incomplete
contracts. American Economic Review 100: 394-419
[31] Janeba E (1998) Tax competition in imperfectly competitive markets. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics 44: 135-153
[32] Janeba E (2002) Attracting FDI in a politically risky world. International Economic Re-
view 43: 1127-1155
[33] Katz BG, Owen J (2006) Should governments compete for foreign direct investment?
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 59: 230-248
[34] Kind HJ, Midelfart Knarvik KH, Schjelderup G (2000) Competing for capital in a ‘lumpy’
world. Journal of Public Economics 78: 253-274
[35] Lahiri S, Ono Y (1988) Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare. The Economic Journal
98: 1199-1202
[36] Lee S (1990) International equity markets and trade policy. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 29: 173-184
[37] Ludema RD, Wooton I (2000) Economic geography and the fiscal eects of regional
integration. Journal of International Economics 52: 331-357
[38] Ludema RD (2001) Optimal international trade agreements and dispute settlement proce-
dures. European Journal of Political Economy 17: 355-376
22
[39] Ludema RD (2002) Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade
agreements. Journal of International Economics 56: 329-358
[40] Mai CC, Peng SK, Tabuchi T (2008) Economic geography with tari competition. Re-
gional Science and Urban Economics 38: 478-486
[41] Maggi G, Rodrı´guez-Clare A (2007) A political-economy theory of trade agreements.
American Economic Review 97: 1374-1406
[42] Markusen JR, Venables AJ (1988) Trade policy with increasing returns and imperfect
competition: contradictory results from competing assumptions. Journal of International
Economics 24: 299-316
[43] Markusen JR, Venables AJ (1998) Multinational firms and the new trade theory. Journal
of International Economics 46: 183-203
[44] Martin P, Rogers CA (1995) Industrial location and public infrastructure. Journal of In-
ternational Economics 39: 335-351
[45] Motta M (1992) Multinational firms and the tari-jumping argument: a game theoretic
analysis with some unconventional conclusions. European Economic Review 36: 1557-
1571
[46] Ottaviano GIP, van Ypersele T (2005) Market size and tax competition. Journal of Inter-
national Economics 67: 25-46
[47] Pflu¨ger M, Su¨dekum J (2008) Integration, agglomeration and welfare. Journal of Urban
Economics 63: 544-566
[48] Ra H (2004) Preferential trade agreements and tax competition for foreign direct invest-
ment. Journal of Public Economics 88: 2745-2763
[49] Sato Y, Thisse JF (2007) Competing for capital when labor is heterogeneous. European
Economic Review 51: 2054-2079
[50] Smith A (1987) Strategic investment, multinational corporations and trade policy. Euro-
pean Economic Review 31: 89-96
[51] Waugh M (2007) Bilateral trade, relative prices, and trade costs. mimeo.
23
Country 1 Country 2
Country 1 r1(2), r1(2) r1(1), r2(1)
Country 2 r2(1), r1(1) r2(0), r2(0)
Table 1: Payo matrix.
r1(2)   r2(1) r1(1)   r2(0) Equilibrium Location
+ + n1 = 2
  + n1 = 1
    n1 = 0
0 + n1  1
  0 n1  1
Table 2: Equilibrium location.
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0 θ1
θ2
a
2
− τ
a
3
− τΦ2
a
4
− τ
B ∩ I
U21 ∩ I
U12 ∩ I
A ∩ I
U12 ∩ C1
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PPPq
U21 ∩ C2
B ∩ C2´3´
Figure 1: Trade and location configurations for  < a=4.
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τV1 + V2
↓ A
↓ U ij ∩ I ↓ B ∩ I
Ci →
Figure 2: Transport costs and maximized global welfare within each set.
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